Discover how advanced control systems improve product consistency, reduce waste, and optimize your extrusion process. Explore our solutions or connect with our team to learn how ICT can modernize your production line.
Get Started TodayAs extrusion control systems have gained remote monitoring, data logging, and network connectivity, they've also inherited a category of risk that plant floors historically didn't have to think much about: cybersecurity. A control panel that was once an isolated, standalone system is now, in many plants, connected to a network that eventually touches the internet — and that connectivity, while genuinely valuable, changes the plant's risk profile in ways that are worth understanding before treating network connection as a routine afterthought to a control upgrade.
Cybersecurity for a production control system isn't the same problem as securing office computers and email, and the differences matter for how plants should approach it.
A compromised office computer might expose data or disrupt business operations. A compromised extrusion control system can stop production, damage equipment, or in a worst case create a genuine safety hazard — the stakes of a control system security incident are physical, not just informational.
Many industrial control components, including drives and PLCs still in service on extrusion lines, were designed and manufactured at a time when network security wasn't a primary design consideration, because the systems weren't expected to be connected to broader networks at all. Retrofitting security onto systems built without it in mind requires deliberate architecture, not just adding a firewall.
Unlike some IT security incidents that primarily affect data, a security incident affecting a control system typically causes immediate production downtime — and depending on the nature of the incident, recovery can take considerably longer than a typical mechanical or electrical fault.
Building strong control system security doesn't require an enterprise-scale cybersecurity program — a handful of fundamental practices address the majority of practical risk for most plants.
The single most important practice is keeping the control system network physically or logically separated from the general business IT network, so that a compromise on one side doesn't automatically provide access to the other. This is typically implemented through dedicated firewalls and clearly defined network zones between the plant floor and the corporate network.
Default passwords on drives, PLCs, and HMI systems are a well-known and frequently exploited vulnerability, precisely because they're often left unchanged after installation. Every device with network connectivity and login capability should have unique, strong credentials, changed from any factory default.
Rather than leaving remote access open continuously, access should be granted only when needed, through a properly secured connection such as a VPN, with logging that records who accessed the system and when — both for security and for troubleshooting accountability.
Drives, PLCs, and HMI software periodically receive security updates from manufacturers addressing known vulnerabilities. Establishing a process for reviewing and applying these updates, rather than leaving systems on whatever version was installed originally, closes a common avenue of exposure over time.
Network security doesn't replace the need for physical security — control panels and any network infrastructure connecting them should be physically secured against unauthorized access, since physical access to a panel often bypasses network-level protections entirely.
A few vulnerability patterns show up repeatedly in industrial control environments, including extrusion plants specifically.
Older remote access setups — sometimes installed years earlier for a specific vendor troubleshooting need and never removed — can remain active and largely forgotten, providing an access point that isn't accounted for in current security planning.
Plants that have grown their network connectivity incrementally, adding devices and connections over time without a deliberate architecture, often end up with a flat network where a device on one line can potentially communicate freely with systems on an entirely different part of the plant, increasing the potential impact of any single compromised device.
Vendors legitimately need remote access for support, but access that's granted broadly and left open indefinitely, rather than scoped to specific needs and time windows, represents an ongoing risk that's easy to overlook once the original need has passed.
Many plants don't have a complete, current inventory of every device connected to their control network — old wireless access points, vendor-installed monitoring devices, or forgotten remote access hardware. Without that inventory, it's difficult to secure a network comprehensively, since unknown devices can't be assessed or managed.
For most extrusion plants, a practical, prioritized approach delivers meaningfully improved security without requiring a large dedicated cybersecurity budget or staff.
Before implementing new security measures, establish a complete inventory of what's currently connected to the control network and assess existing vulnerabilities — default credentials, unpatched systems, flat network architecture — as a baseline for prioritizing improvements.
If only one improvement is feasible in the near term, network segmentation between the control system and the general business network typically delivers the largest risk reduction relative to its implementation cost.
Control system security sits at the intersection of information technology and industrial engineering, and effective security planning generally requires input from both — IT teams often lack visibility into control system operational requirements, while plant engineering teams often lack deep network security expertise.
When planning a control system upgrade, building security architecture in from the beginning — rather than treating it as something to address after the fact — is both more effective and typically less expensive than retrofitting security onto a system that was designed without it in mind.
Security measures that make the system too difficult for legitimate users to operate efficiently tend to get worked around, which can create worse security outcomes than a more balanced approach.
Overly restrictive access controls that slow down legitimate vendor troubleshooting during a production emergency can create pressure to bypass security measures informally, which undermines the security program more than a well-designed, appropriately scoped access process would.
Access needs change over time — vendors change, staff roles change, projects end. Periodically reviewing who has access to the control network and removing access that's no longer needed keeps the security posture aligned with actual current requirements.
Not necessarily. A practical, prioritized approach — starting with network segmentation, strong credentials, and controlled remote access — addresses the majority of risk for most plants without requiring a large dedicated security staff, though input from IT expertise is valuable.
It can be, if access is scoped to specific needs, granted through a properly secured connection, and logged — leaving broad, indefinite access open after the original need has passed is the more common source of risk.
Network segmentation between the control system and the general business IT network typically provides the largest risk reduction relative to implementation effort, making it a reasonable starting priority.
Older systems can often be secured to a meaningful degree through network architecture and access controls, even if the devices themselves weren't originally designed with security in mind — though systems with no ability to support modern authentication or patching have inherent limitations that architecture alone can't fully offset.
